

## **A Charlie Hebdo-ügy nyomában - beszélgetés filozófiai sajtószemelvények mentén -**

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#### **I. Szólásszabadság**

Daniel Weinstock (McGill) – “The (Messy) Ethics of Freedom of Speech“  
<http://induecourse.ca/the-messy-ethics-of-freedom-of-speech/>

Debate has had to do not so much with whether *Charlie Hebdo* has the right to publish the kinds of cartoons that has been their stock in trade, but whether they were ethically justified to exercise that right in the case of the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed. The argument [...] is that though the cartoonists had the (legal) right to publish the cartoons of the Prophet, they (morally) ought not to have done so, knowing the offense that those cartoons would cause to Muslims both in France, and around the world.

As many have noted, however, there is no right in a democracy not to be offended. There is a right not to be defamed or libeled, and in Canada there is a right not to be targeted by hate speech. When speakers (or writers, or cartoonists) stay within those limits, the thought runs, there is an obligation on the part of those whose religious beliefs may have been targeted to be sufficiently thick-skinned to take it, rather than an obligation on the part of speakers to censor themselves for fear that they will offend.

[...]

We all know the hoary expression “I’m not laughing at you, I’m laughing with you”. The expression is meant to express to an individual or a group who has been the butt of a joke that the joke was meant, as paradoxical as this may sound, as a mark of friendship and solidarity rather than as a sign of contempt or disrespect. [...] When jokes are proffered among equals in a context of relative trust, it is quite easy to view them as expressing, and even as strengthening, a relationship of civic amity and trust. Laughter can strengthen bonds of civic amity. Our ability to laugh at one another without causing hurt is a sign that we have reached a high level of trust.

When laughter is directed by members of socially dominant groups at groups that are socially marginalized and targeted for discrimination, the situation is radically different. It’s much more difficult to expect groups that are the objects of discrimination to react to jokes directed at their

most cherished symbols and beliefs as “laughter with” rather than “laughter at”. In such cases, jokes risk exacerbating division and distrust, rather than expressing and cementing civic friendship, as they can do when relations between groups are marked by trust. And this is the case, regardless of the intention of the person making the joke.

It’s hard to deny that Muslim religious minorities are in precarious positions in many Western countries. Pundits and politicians have been making political hay for years now by associating Muslim communities as a whole with the small groups of extremists who have been carrying out murderous attacks like the ones that killed 17 people in Paris. So whereas *in general* one would hope to live in a society in which trust and equality obtain to a degree sufficient to warrant accusations of thin-skin among those who are unable to accept jokes being publicly leveled at them, it is clear that we do not live in such a society. It isn’t unreasonable for Muslims to feel that caricatures like those that were *Charlie Hebdo*’s reinforce their marginalization, and thus, to feel hurt by them.

Does that mean that the caricaturists were morally wrong, although legally justified, to publish the cartoons poking fun at Islam? Again, things are more complicated. Let’s distinguish two possible interpretations of the cartoons lampooning Islam. According to a first, the only purpose of the caricatures is to shock and cause offense. On this view, they are largely devoid of cognitive content, and have as their sole function to present images calculated to cause hurt. According to a second, the intention is to make a point about some religious beliefs and symbols, but to do so in a shocking way that one can foresee will cause offence. On this interpretation, the cartoons are making a point (though obviously a point with which one might disagree) about religion, but doing so in a shocking manner. According to this second interpretation, form is inextricably tied to content. That is, the cartoonists would not be saying exactly the same thing were they to prescind from expressing themselves through shocking images, and to make their points in more stolid prose.

The interests at stake in the two ways of interpreting *Charlie Hebdo* are clearly different. Though there is a right to offend, civic friendship depends upon our exercising prudence when we do so, and we appropriately look askance at those who use the right in a manner so potentially destructive of the civic bond. But if there is real communicative intent that does not fall foul of *legal* strictures against hate speech, incitement to violence, libel and slander, and the like, my view is that we should stand up not just for the legal, but also for the moral right of people to make the points they want to make, even as we devote ourselves to showing up those positions as mistaken. It is one thing to say that someone is morally wrong in what she says; it is quite another to say that she is morally wrong to say something that we consider to be morally wrong.

Are the *Charlie Hebdo* cartoons a case of “pure” offence, or are they intended to communicate something (which we may believe to be mistaken) about religious beliefs and symbols? I’ll confess to not having surveyed the cartoons published in the magazine thoroughly enough to say, though my sense from perusing the archive in a somewhat unsystematic manner is that they probably conform to the second interpretation, rather than the first. If this is the case, we find ourselves in the messy situation of having to uphold not just the legal, but also the moral right of satirists to express thoughts and display images that they can reasonably foresee will offend, while at the same time understanding those of our fellow citizens who have felt that the cartoons exacerbate their feeling of marginalization.

How do we extricate ourselves from this conundrum? First, we have to combat the causes of social marginalization that make it the case that many Muslims feel unable, in the present context, simply to laugh off the caricatures, as they might feel able to do were they more

confident of their place in Western societies. Second, we have to make sure that we do not count some groups' free speech interests more heavily than we do that of others. Indeed, the French state has not been as fulsome in its defence of free speech as it might have been in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris. If we believe that the right to freedom of speech should include the right to communicate ideas offensively, then we should not tolerate that the offense of some counts more in the eyes of the state than does that of others.

## **II. Multikulturalizmus és iszlám identitás Franciaországban**

Ld. a külön csatolt fénymásolatban: Beszélgetés Balázs Gábor történésszel (Losoncz Márk), *Híd*, 2015. június, 6. szám, részlet.

## **III. Iszlám és a Nyugat**

### **1. Michael Walzer: Islamism and the Left, Dissent, Winter 2015**

<http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/islamism-and-the-left#ftn15>

Today, every major world religion is experiencing a significant revival, and revived religion isn't an opiate as we once thought, but a very strong stimulant. Since the late 1970s, and particularly in the last decade, this stimulant is working most powerfully in the Islamic world. From Pakistan to Nigeria, and in parts of Europe, too, Islam today is a religion capable of inspiring large numbers of men and women, mostly men, to kill and die on its behalf. So the Islamic revival is a kind of testing moment for the left: can we recognize and resist "the possibility of tyranny?" Some of us are trying to meet the test; many of us are actively failing it. One reason for this failure is the terrible fear of being called "Islamophobic." Anti-Americanism and a radical version of cultural relativism also play an important part, but these are older pathologies. Here is something new: many leftists are so irrationally afraid of an irrational fear of Islam that they haven't been able to consider the very good reasons for fearing Islamist zealots—and so they have difficulty explaining what's going on in the world.

For myself, I live with a generalized fear of every form of religious militancy. I am afraid of Hindutva zealots in India, of messianic Zionists in Israel, and of rampaging Buddhist monks in Myanmar. But I admit that I am most afraid of Islamist zealots because the Islamic world at this moment in time (not always, not forever) is especially feverish and fervent. Indeed, the politically engaged Islamist zealots can best be understood as today's crusaders.

Is this an anti-Muslim position, not a fear but a phobia—and a phobia that grows out of prejudice and hostility? Consider a rough analogy (all analogies are rough): if I say that Christianity in the eleventh century was a crusading religion and that it was dangerous to Jews and Muslims, who were rightly fearful (and some of them phobic)—would that make me anti-Christian? I know that crusading fervor isn't essential to the Christian religion; it is historically contingent, and the crusading moment in Christian history came and, after two hundred years or so, went. Saladin helped bring it to an end, but it would have ended on its own. I know that many Christians opposed the Crusades; today we would call them Christian "moderates." And, of course, most eleventh-century Christians weren't interested in crusading warfare; they listened to sermons urging them to march to Jerusalem and they went home. Still, it is true without a doubt that in the

eleventh century, much of the physical, material, and intellectual resources of Christendom were focused on the Crusades.

[...]

One can and should say similar things about Islamists today—even though jihadi violence is not required by Islamic theology, even though there are many Muslim “moderates” who oppose religious violence, and even though most Muslims are quite happy to leave infidels and heretics to their otherworldly fate. I know that there is a “jihad of the soul” in addition to the “jihad of the sword,” and that Mohammed famously declared the first of these to be the greater jihad. And I recognize that the Islamic world is not monolithic. Reading the daily newspaper, anyone can see that even Islamist zealotry is not all of a piece. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah, Hamas, and Boko Haram, to take just a few leading examples, are not the same; there may well be significant theological disagreements among them. [...] Despite all these qualifications, it is true without a doubt that the “jihad of the sword” is very strong today, and it is frightening to non-believers, heretics, secular liberals, social democrats, and liberated women in much of the Muslim world. And the fear is entirely rational.

[...]

It’s true that Europe’s Muslims (and America’s too, to a lesser extent) are a harassed minority; they rightly receive sympathy and support from the left, which also hopes, rightly again, to win their votes as they become citizens. There are many right-wing groups that campaign against Islam—not only far-right splinter groups like the English Defense League in the UK or Die Freiheit or Pro-Deutschland in Germany, but populist parties that command considerable electoral support, like the National Front in France or the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Since the political leaders of all these groups claim to fear the “rise” of Islam in Europe, Islamophobia has become for everyone on the left politically incorrect; more important, it is morally incorrect.

Islamophobia is a form of religious intolerance, even religious hatred, and it would be wrong for any leftists to support bigots in Europe and the United States who deliberately misunderstand and misrepresent contemporary Muslims. They make no distinction between the historic religion and the zealots of this moment; they regard every Muslim immigrant in a Western country as a potential terrorist; and they fail to acknowledge the towering achievements of Muslim philosophers, poets, and artists over many centuries.

[...]

But we have to be careful here. There are perfectly legitimate criticisms that can be made not only of Islamist zealots but also of Islam itself—as of any other religion. Pascal Bruckner argues that the term “Islamophobia” was “a clever invention because it amounts to making Islam a subject that one cannot touch without being accused of racism.”<sup>5</sup> [...] it is worth repeating Bruckner’s key point: there has to be room for feminists like Millett and for all the militant atheists and philosophical skeptics to say their piece about Islam—and also about Christianity and Judaism—and to find an audience if they can.

[...]

The left has always had difficulty recognizing the power of religion. Aren’t all religions the ideological tools of the ruling class? And aren’t all millennialist and messianic uprisings the ideologically distorted response of subaltern groups to material oppression? Religious zealotry is a superstructural phenomenon and can only be explained by reference to the economic base.

[...]

There are also people on the left who believe that Islamist zealotry is not only produced by Western imperialism but is a form of resistance to it. Whatever groups it actually attracts, it is fundamentally an ideology of the oppressed—a version, though a little strange, of left politics.

[...]

All these left responses to Islamist zealots—identification, support, sympathy, apology, tolerance, and avoidance—look very strange if we consider the actual content of their ideology. Jihadi opposition to “the West” should provoke serious worry on the left before any other response. Boko Haram began with an attack on “Western-style” schools, and other Islamist groups have undertaken similar attacks, especially on schools for girls. Values that the zealots denounce as “Western” are very much in contention here: individual liberty, democracy, gender equality, and religious pluralism. [...] the Islamists are definitely committed. They have their own large ambitions, but these are highly idealistic ambitions, which leave little room for material interests. Their zealotry is a value zealotry, theologically driven, and it is a real challenge to “Western” values.

But individual liberty, democracy, gender equality, and religious pluralism aren’t really Western values; they are universal values that first appeared in strong, modern versions in Western Europe and the Americas. These are the values that pretty much define the left, which also first appeared in its strong, modern version in Western Europe and the Americas. The left is an eighteenth-century invention, an invention of the secular Enlightenment. There were, of course, people who held potentially leftist positions in all the major religious traditions—pacifists, communitarians, proto-environmentalists, advocates for the poor, even people who believed in equality or, better, who believed in the equal standing before God of all believers (I should probably say, of all male believers). But nothing like the classic left ever existed among Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, or Christians. And the values of the left are those “Western” values, taken very seriously. So the opposition to those values is really something that the left should confront—and the strongest opposition right now comes from Islamist radicals. And this is the very reason that many leftists are reluctant to confront the Islamist radicals.

[...]

What would a genuinely leftist movement against oppression and poverty look like? First of all, it would be a movement of the oppressed, a mobilization of men and women, previously passive, inarticulate, and frightened, now able to speak for themselves and defend their human rights. Second, its aim would be the liberation or, better, the self-emancipation of those same people. And its driving force would be a vision, no doubt partially shaped by the local culture, of a new society whose members, men and women alike, would be more free and more equal and whose government would be responsive and accountable. That’s not an unusual description of left aspiration. So it’s a mystery that anyone anywhere can seriously believe that any Islamist group belongs to the global, or any other, left.

How should the left respond to those Islamist groups—assuming, as I believe, that a critical response is necessary. [...] How to help those who are targeted by Islamist forces is a question that we will have to address again and again. But we should begin with the ideological war.

In that war, we need first to distinguish between Islamist zealotry and Islam itself. [...] We should insist particularly on the difference between the writings of zealots like Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt or Maulana Maududi in India and the work of the great rationalist philosophers of the Muslim past and the liberal reformers of more recent times. We should do this in exactly the same way as we would distinguish between the preachers and sermons of the Christian crusades and Scholastic theology.

[...]

Second, we have to acknowledge that the academic theory (which was also a left theory) that predicted the inevitable triumph of science and secularism isn't right—at least, its time horizon isn't right. Leftists have to figure out how to defend the secular state in this “post-secular” age and how to defend equality and democracy against religious arguments for hierarchy and theocracy. The appeal of religious doctrine and practice is obvious today, and we need to understand it if we are to persuade people that religious zealotry is frighteningly unappealing.

Third, we should recognize the power of the zealots and the extent of their political reach. We should clearly name the zealots our enemies and commit ourselves to an intellectual campaign against them—that is, a campaign in defense of liberty, democracy, equality, and pluralism. I am not arguing that leftists should join the famous “clash of civilizations.” All the great religious civilizations are capable, and probably equally capable, of producing violent fanatics and peace-loving saints—and everything in between. So we shouldn't think about the struggle with Islamists in civilizational but rather in ideological terms.

## **2. Seyla Benhabib: Piety or Rage? On the Charlie Hebdo Massacres**

<http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Piety-or-Rage.pdf>

[...]

On the same day as the attack on Charlie Hebdo 26 died in an attack in Yemen, more than that number in Iraq. Who is counting anymore? Two weeks ago more than 130 school children were massacred in Peshawar, Pakistan. Every week hundreds of refugees arrive on the shores of Europe from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, etc. A big swath of the globe, extending from North and Eastern North Africa to vast regions of the Middle East and all the way to the mountains of Afghanistan is caught in a death spiral, with states and societies disintegrating at dizzying speeds. What is happening in this swath of the world? And how exactly is it related to the recent violence in Europe, in Australia, in Canada, and most likely soon again, in the United States as well?

It is not enough to repeat the old bromides about Islam and violence; the Koran and the anti-Enlightenment; the need to stand up for the West... Yes, yes, all that is true but does it help us understand why, with the exception of countries like Turkey, Jordan, Iran, Morocco and Tunus, the center does not hold in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen? Or when it does, as in the Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, it does so at the cost of unmitigated repression and corruption?

The condition of these societies is not only generating blind rage among many young Muslims (men in particular), but also something deeper that I will call “civilizational despair.” You cannot cure this by declaring war on Jihad. For many young Muslims there seems no way out of the cycle of violence, corruption, and poverty. Coupled with the condition of unemployment and marginalization, contempt and sarcasm, exploitation and scorn that many suffer – whether in Paris or London, Berlin or Athens, Rome or Amsterdam, Oslo or Copenhagen – the fertile ground is there for recruiting and training Jihadists to join the hundreds of groups that have now mushroomed in the Middle East.

[...]

No, I don't think that the attack on Charlie Hebdo and the ensuing violence is just a reaction to the offense to Prophet Mohammed or to Islam; neither do I think that it is about what the Koran says or does not say about blasphemy and apostasy. At its root, it is driven by Muslim rage and Arab Muslim civilizational despair. Islam's current-day reformers are few and far between, while itinerant and fiery preachers like al-Madoudi have captured global audiences. But even if there were a significant reform movement within Islam, I don't believe that this would be enough. What is needed is a regional or international effort on the scale of a Marshall plan for the Arab Muslim world that will invest in infrastructure, communications, agriculture, industry, medicine and education. Just as Europe was pulled out of its devastation after WWII, so too this region which is almost bleeding to death, needs to be resuscitated.

At least forty million people died in Europe before peace could be reestablished, the European Union could emerge and Germany could be brought back to the standard of living it had enjoyed before the WWII. The sum total of the devastation and wars in the larger Middle East has not yet been tallied. I suspect that the casualties number around 5-8 million. Do we have to wait until we reach the same levels of devastation as in Europe before we realize that the way to end many Muslim's civilizational despair is to provide hope? Wasn't this the promise of the Arab Spring revolutions? They did not succeed in my view for at least three reasons:

a. Many regimes in the Middle East are in the grips either of reactionary oligarchies supported by the West – such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates- or of successor military-civilian regimes that emerged out of coups that displaced those oligarchies (Nasserism and Ba'athism in Egypt and Syria; The Qaddafi revolution in Libya). Western powers (but also the Soviet Union and Russia) have supported one or another of these groups for their purposes throughout centuries. Civil society and the forces of political representation are weak and stunted, and repressed as soon as they take root;

b. The game of superpower influence in this region continues. The CIA and the British Intelligence Service deposed the Mossadegh regime, who had nationalized Iran's oil industry and who was suspected of being a communist, in 1953, throwing its support behind that of the corrupt Shah Pahlavi who would then be overthrown in the early 1979 by the Khomeini Revolution. Against growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the United States armed the mujahadeen and the Islamists; the Soviet Union withdrew and the USA inherited the mess it had created by supporting Islamist forces against communism. The Soviet Union and now Russia have maintained a special relationship with Syria and continue to do so. After Russia persuaded President Obama not to attack Syria once it became clear that it had used chemical weapons on its own population, the Syrian situation ran into a stalemate. The victims of this manoeuvring were the civilian population and the refugees who were deprived of free passage to neighboring countries to be guaranteed by a no-fly zone protected by NATO and US possibly.

[...]

c. The wound that the continuing Israeli- Palestinian conflict has inflicted upon the Arab psyche cannot be underestimated. Surely, the hypocrisy of many Arab states such as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia in using the misery and vulnerability of the Palestinian refugees for their own purposes cannot be forgotten. All states in this region, at one time or another, exploited the Israeli-Palestinian impasse – whether it be to destabilize their neighbors, propagate their own brand of Islam, or whip up anti-Semitism among their own populations to divert attention from their own corrupt and autocratic purposes.

Nor can we overlook the fact that Israel, whether willingly or not, has been the most vivid reminder to Palestinians and Arabs of the weaknesses, ineptitudes and blockages in their own civilization. Despair about the state of the Arab Muslim world is also despair about the humiliation suffered at the hands of the Israel. And I say this is as a Jew, committed to the existence of Israel in a peaceful Middle East as a democratic state.

Since it has not been possible to resolve this conflict so far, and because the United States's commitment to Israel has been unwavering, Muslim Arab hopelessness has balled into venomous resentment against the West in general – leading to such absurd beliefs that the Twin Towers were not brought down by planes guided by Al-Qaeda Jihadists but by Jews themselves!

Can this global picture of Arab-Muslim rage and despair really explain why two French-Algerian citizens would select Charlie Hebdo rather than any other target and attack it?

To focus the debate so narrowly, upon the questions of intolerance, blasphemy, apostasy in Islam or the aesthetics of Charlie Hebdo's caricatures, is to miss the real point. Until enough changes take place in these societies and until the rage and humiliation suffered by Europe's Muslims is mitigated through economic and social programs of successful integration, there will be other targets, and if not caricatures, then telenovellas, operas, video games or other forms of cultural expression which will be attacked. For they are not the cause but simply the occasion for venting rage and despair.

### **3. Slavoj Žižek: A gonoszok intenzitása tényleg véres szenvedély?**

<http://pulpul.net/komoly/slavoj-zizek-charlie-hebdo-szerkesztosegeben-tortent-meszarlasol>

(Nagy Gabriella fordítása; Eredeti: Slavoj Žižek on the Charlie Hebdo massacre: Are the worst really full of passionate intensity? <http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/01/slavoj-zizek-charlie-hebdo-massacre-are-worst-really-full-passionate-intensity>)

Most van itt az idő – amikor még mindenki a *Charlie Hebdo* székházában történt vérengzés utóhatása alatt áll –, hogy bátorságot merítsünk, és elkezdjük *gondolkodni*. Természetesen egyhangúan a szabadságunk alapjai ellen irányuló támadásként kell a tragédiához viszonyulnunk, és mindenfajta okoskodás és sugallt indokok nélkül kell elítélnünk (az olyasfélék nélkül mint pl. a *Charlie Hebdo* egyértelmően ingerelte és túlságosan megalázta a muzulmánokat). Azonban az ilyen pátoszos, egyetemes szolidaritás nem elég, ennél tovább kell mennünk.

Az általam sürgetett gondolkodásnak semmi köze a bűncselekmény érdemtelen relativizálásához (az olyan mantrákhoz mint „Mi nyugatiak, akik a harmadik világban szörnyő vérengzéseket hajtottunk már végre, hogy jövünk ahhoz, hogy ítéletet mondjunk ilyen cselekedetek felett?”). Még kevésbé kapcsolódik sok nyugati baloldali gondolkodó már-már kóros félelméhez, hogy esetlegesen iszlámellenességgel vádolják. Az ilyen álbaloldali számára az iszlám ellen mondott bárminemű kritika a nyugati világ iszlámellenességének és iszlámtól való félelmének a kifejeződése, és az ilyen személyek nyilatkozták Salman Rushdie-ről, hogy szükségtelenül provokálja a muzulmán hívőket és emiatt (legalábbis részben) felelős a felette halálos ítélet kimondó *fatwáért*. Nem meglepő az ilyen hozzáállás eredménye: minél több nyugati liberális baloldali nyilatkozik a büntudatáról, a muzulmán fundamentalisták annál inkább képmutatónak állítják be őket, akik az iszlámellenességüket próbálják ilyen köntösbe csomagolni. A csillagok ezen állása pedig a szuperegő paradoxonját vonja maga után: minél inkább beadod a derekad a Másik követeléseinek, annál mélyebbre süllyedsz a bűnösök padjában. Mondhatnánk azt is, hogy az iszlámmal szembeni toleranciával arányosan nő a rád helyezett nyomás is.

[...]



A terroristák démonizálásától nem elég a hősi halált halt öngyilkos fanatikus irányába elmozdulnunk, hanem sokkal inkább ezt a démoni mítoszt kell teljes egészében eloszlatnunk. Több mint száz évvel ezelőtt, Friedrich Nietzsche már felismerte, hogy a nyugati civilizáció az „utolsó ember” – egy apátiával, szenvedélyektől és elköteleződéstől mentes lény – irányába halad, akinek nincsenek álmai, életunt, nem vállal kockázatot, és kizárólag a kényelmét és biztonságát keresi, valamint a másik irányába toleranciát mutat: „Időként egy kis méreg, és szépet álmodunk. Végül a sok méreg hatására a halálunk is szépen eljön. A pillanatnyi kis napközbeni és éjszakai örömeiket biztosítják, és a saját egészségük foglalkoztatja őket. »Megtaláltuk a boldogságot« – mondta az „utolsó ember” maroknyi csoportja, és lehunyta a szemüket.”

Akár úgy is tűnhet, hogy a megengedő, fejlett világ és a fundamentalisták reakciója közötti szakadék inkább az anyagi és kulturális javakban dúskáló hosszú élet és egy transzcendens „ügy” melletti elköteleződés között feszül. Nem erről az antagonizmusról mondta Nietzsche, hogy „passzív” és „aktív” nihilizmus? Minket, a nyugati világot tekinthetjük a nietzschei „utolsó embernek”, aki bugyuta napi örömeiben mártózik meg, miközben a muzulmán radikálisok pedig mindent készek kockára tenni, és egészen az önpusztításig részt vesznek a küzdelemben. William Butler Yeats „A második eljövétel” versében tökéletesen összegzi jelenkorunk terhet: „A jóknak nincs hite, a gonoszok intenzitása véres szenvedély.” (fordította: Nagy László) A vérszegény liberálisok és a szenvedély fűtötte fundamentalisták között feszülő szakadékot kiválóan leírják e sorok. „A jók” már nem képesek többé teljes egészében bevonódni, míg a „rosszak” rasszista, vallási és nemi alapon történő fanatizmusban tobzódnak.

A terrorista fundamentalistákra tényleg igaz volna ez a leírás? Nyilvánvaló, hogy nem látjuk bennük azt, amit az igazi fundamentalistákban igen – legyen szó a tibeti szerzetesekről vagy az amerikai ámisokról – mégpedig a neheztelés és irigység hiányát, a hitetlenek élete iránti mély közönyt. Ha napjaink ún. fundamentalistái tényleg hiszik, hogy megtalálták az utat a nagybetűs Igazsághoz, akkor miért érzik azt, hogy a nem hívők fenyegetést jelentenek a számunkra, és miért irigylik őket? A buddhista nem ítéli el a nyugati hedonistát. Mindössze jóindulatúan konstatálja, hogy a hedonista önpusztító módon keresi a boldogságot. A valódi fundamentalistákkal összehasonlítva a terrorista álfundamentalistákat ténylegesen zavarja, piszkálja és lenyűgözi a hitetlenek bűnös élete. Azt érezheti az ember, hogy a bűnös elleni küzdelemben a saját kísértéseik ellen harcolnak.

Yeats diagnózisa itt mutatkozik elégtelennek korunk leírására: a terroristák véres szenvedéllyel bíró intenzitása híján van a tényleges meggyőződésnek. Mennyire ingatag alapokon áll egy iszlamista hite, ha egy szatirikus hetilapban megjelentett karikatúrától már fenyegetve éri magát? A fundamentalista iszlám terror *nem* a terroristák önnön felsőbbrendűségébe vetett meggyőződésen alapul, sem azon a vágyukon, hogy kulturális-vallási identitásukat megőrizték a globális fogyasztói társadalom pusztításától. A fundamentalistákkal nem az a probléma, hogy mi alacsonyabb rendűnek tekintenénk őket, hanem, hogy *ők maguk* gondolják ezt magukról, nem nyíltan. Pontosán emiatt, amikor leereszkedően, politikailag korrekt módon bizonygatjuk, hogy mi nem gondoljuk magunkat különben náluk, csak olajat öntünk a tűzre, és tovább tápláljuk az irányunkba érzett neheztelést. A probléma nem a kulturális különbségben rejlik (vagyis az identitásuk megőrzésére irányuló erőfeszítésükben), hanem pontosan ennek ellenkezőjében: a szélsőségesek már most olyanok, mint mi, és szépen, titokban magukévá tették a mi mércénket, és ennek megfelelően vizsgálják magukat. Paradox módon a fundamentalisták pontosan a saját felsőbbrendűségükbe vetett „rasszista” meggyőződés hiányáról tesznek tanúbizonyságot.